The Embodied Robot

I suspect that much of the marriage between robots and the term embodiment comes as a definition. Robots are devices that function in physical space, as concrete rather than abstract inventions. Embodiment, therefore, is a way to describe the issues that come with trying to design physical works.

There is a second notion of embodiment, however, that may be more interesting to consider for the domain of social robotics. It involves sharing responsibility for the value and function of a robot between the device and its human partners … keeping “embodied robot” from being redundant.

Actions are an Outcome

Human-computer interaction (HCI) has long been interested in the objects of interaction. In work that influenced Don Norman’s foundational contributions to the interaction design, J.J. Gibson described the relationship between the organism and the environment [7]. The observer constructs meaning from the individual properties and specific actions evident in the situation. Gibson stops short, however, at suggesting the same is true for the environment:

“The concept of affordance is derived from these concepts of valence, invitation, and demand but with a crucial difference. The affordance of something does not change as the need of the observer changes. The observer may or may not perceive or attend to the affordance, according to his needs, but the affordance, being invariant, is always there to be perceived.” [7, p138]

Conceptually, actions are often considered tangible. It is as if we can take that action, put it in a box representing the conditions of the environment, and have it act a certain way. If we put that action in a different box, or put a different action in the same box, new things happen. Either way, the action and box, or context, are separable.

Anthropologist Lucy Suchman describes action as an outcome rather than an intention. Actions arise from a context in which actors and resources interact. Any plan can only reflect what has happened and anticipate what is to come [10]. Outside of the moment, action doesn’t exist.

On the surface, Gibson’s perspective appears to match well with the attitude of many roboticists. Different humans may interact with robots in distinct ways, but the success of a human-robot interaction is dictated by the quality of design in the device. People are involved only to benefit from the robot’s skills. If human-robot interaction (HRI) adopts Suchman’s insights, robots could be designed to benefit from those interactions, too. The robot could be seen as both agent and environment.

Embodied Interaction

These conceptualizations of action echo two notions of embodiment. The first emphasizes physicality, an idea or action manifesting in the world. This definition arises from a reductionist perspective that wishes to objectify things in order to turn them into rational, wholly understandable entities. The second notion comes from a phenomenological perspective, arguing that categorization of the world is imposed rather than pre-existing. In this sense, embodiment is a phenomenon that occurs in real time, in real space [4,5].

Embodied agency—which typically takes the form of things like dialoguing avatars and robotic media—embraces the first interpretation. Embodied conversational agents (ECA) distinguish themselves from traditional forms of dialogue systems through the nonverbal behaviors they are able to convey [3]. The agent is not necessarily a co-creator of experience.

Paul Dourish represents the seminal thinking about the second interpretation. In Where the Action Is, Dourish suggests that not only are tangible and social computing the second-wave evolution of computer interaction, they are also two halves of the same coin:

“[Embodied interaction] is an approach to the design and analysis of interaction that takes embodiment to be central to, even constitutive of, the whole phenomenon” [5, p102]

In other words, it is not enough that something lives in the world. Embodiment in this sense demands that we recognize that its existence shapes the world around it, which in turns affects how it is manifested.

Facilitate the Co-creation of Meaning

It is a radical idea to suggest that not only should you holistically examine a system, you must do so. Embodied interaction changes the question from how can people do their work, to how can people create their own meanings and uses [4].

In HCI, this is evident in a transition to “third wave” methodologies [1]: exploration is now laced with ambiguity in the form of culturally embedded computing [9] and cultural probes [6]. These inquiries attempt to inform design decisions without absolutes. (Old habits die hard, however, as HCI often tries to transform these approaches back into concrete findings [2].) The design of systems dependent on community participation faces challenges both in development and evaluation [8].

The same is likely applicable for HRI, where design involves a more constrained form of IT. Roboticists could benefit from some of the techniques researchers use in HCI, but there are sure to be some means of inquiry that will be specific to the domain. An embodied robot must examine its environment and other agents in such a way that allows it participate in the creation of meaning, rather than just reflect a fixed understanding or reality.

References

1. Bødker, S. (2006). When second wave HCI meets third wave challenges. In: Proc. of NordCHI’06, pp. 1-8.
2. Boehner, K., Vertesi, J., Sengers, P., and Dourish, P. (2007). How HCI interprets the probes. In: Proceedings of CHI’07, pp. 1077-1086.
3. Cassell, J. (2000). Nudge nudge wink wink: Elements of face-to-face conversation for embodied conversational agents. Embodied Conversational Agents. MIT Press., pp. 2-28.
4. Dourish, P. (2004). What we talk about when we talk about context. Persuasive & Ubiquitous Computing, 8, pp. 19-30.
5. Dourish, P. (2001). Where the action is: The foundations of embodied interaction. Cambridge: MIT Press.
6. Gaver, G., Dunne, T., and Pacenti, E. (1999). Cultural Probes. Interactions, pp. 21-29.
7. Gibson, J.J. (1979). The ecological approach to visual perception. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin.
8. Ryan, W., Hazlewood, W.R., & Makice, K. (2008). Twitterspace: A co-developed display using Twitter to enhance community awareness. PDC ’08, pp. 230-234.
9. Sengers, P., Kaye, J., Boehner, K., Fairbank, J., Gay, G., Medynskiy, Y., and Wyche, S. (2004). Culturally embedded computing. IEEE Pervasive Computing, pp. 14-21.
10. Suchman, L. (1987). Plans and situated actions: The problem of human-machine communications. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-67.